the premises of the Realist approach and the standards established in US foreign drug policy, 5 I analyse the US process of certification. I point out that its application has accentuated the struggles of security between the US and Andean countries. Also, I refer to the effects of the restricted notion of security on the regulation of the alternative development programmes and the trade preferences granted by the US to the Andean countries producers of coca. The third section suggests the concrete lessons that can be drawn from critical approaches in the field of international relations for the modification of current US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries. In this regard I underline the importance of trade, aid, and development as related venues to face the economic and social problems affecting Andean rural areas and improve counter-narcotic efforts in this region.
I.-Overview of US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries
For the purpose of explanation, the various regulations constituting this policy area may be classified into two: those that establish policies of control and those that establish 5 The works of Bagley and Gonzales develop the argument that the US is using a realist framework especially in the formulation of the process of certification and in the provision of military aid to combat narcotraffic in the Andean region. Here I extend their analysis to other schemes included in this policy area related to the promotion of aid and development. Due to limited space in the present paper I mention but do not analyse the military aid issue, a paramount but complex problem that requires to be scrutinised in a comprehensive and detailed way. Nonetheless, it is worth noting two aspects in this regard. First, like the process of certification, the provision of military aid has also had unintended consequences with devastating effects in the fight against narcotraffic. Furthermore, it has contributed to human rights violations in the Andean rural areas. Abundant literature tackles the problems related to the military aid issue. See especially the "Washington Office of Latin America (WOLA) Drug War Monitor." Second, the inclusion of military aid in US foreign drug policy might respond not only to the influence of the IR realist approach in this policy area, but also to other interests and interactions. For instance, the self-interest of the "security industry" (state agencies included, especially those in the defense area which after the end of the Cold War have been assigned new tasks and their increasing budgets have been legitimized by the proclaimed need to counter new external threats). In this regard see for instance Glen Segell, "The narcotics war and civil-military relations", paper presented at the International Studies Association conference, 14-18 March, 2000, Los Angeles.
fails to meet either of the requirements it is "decertified" and the US may reduce its aid and oppose the approval of multilateral loans to that nation. In the second group, there are the alternative development programs (ADPs) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), presently known as ATPEA. ADPs are designed to assist Andean nations to promote legal activities alternative to the production of coca. With that same purpose, ATPEA authorises the President of the US to proclaim duty-free or duty reductions for eligible imported goods from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Regarding "military aid," although in its budgetary reports the US places that as part of its "economic assistance to the Andean region," such a particular aid is clearly a strategy of control.
Through military aid the US provides technical and logistical support to Andean military and police forces for the interception of drug-traffickers and the implementation of the forced programmes of eradication of drug crops in the Andean nations.
I have stated that this classification of policies of control and aid is only for the purpose of explanation because although each of these policies is supposed to tackle a specific aspect of the illegal drug problem, in practice both are related. As discussed in the following sections, in the line of a restricted securitisation of the drug problem US policymakers have emphasised the application of the schemes of control in a way that has had a detrimental effect on the objectives foreseen on the policies of aid.
II.-The "securitization" of the drug problem in US foreign drug policy
Waever warns that although the security label may be useful to signal danger and set priorities, when a problem is "securitized" there is the risk of addressing it in particular ways: threat, defence, and state-centred solutions. 6 Such a limited "securitization" leads to the application of the traditional logic of military behavior to non-military problems.
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Unfortunately, the securitisation of the drug problem has been carried out in this way. As a result, in addition to the drug problem, its securitisation under the banner of "national security" proper of the realist approach, is also problematic and causes various flaws in US foreign drug policy.
6 Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization." In Ronnie Lipschtuz, On Security, p. 25 7 Ibid
How a problem is defined or represented in the minds of decision-makers can be expected to influence how they choose to respond to that problem. 8 As claimed by critics of realism that recognise the interplay between theory and practice, and knowledge and power, the narrow terms of a realist dominated IR discipline have framed the understanding of the "world out there" and determined the analytical politico-strategic responses to it. 9 A lengthy exploration of the process through which theory (in this case IR realism) has influenced US policy makers concretely in the formulation of foreign drug policy, goes beyond the scope of the present paper. 10 Not only it is difficult to establish the detailed process through which policymakers directly avail themselves of scholarship to formulate policy responses, but also as noted by George, the policymaking process is often driven by internal and international political forces that may limit the impact of knowledge provided by scholarship. 11 Nonetheless, the remarkable coincidences between the guidelines and objectives established in US foreign drug policy and the IR realist premises denote the importance attributed by policymakers to realism and to the practice of military strategies in the line of that approach.
Within the realist framework "national security" is defined as the imperative of defending the state (primarily its territory) against external dangers, by increasing 16 During the two terms of President Clinton, the governments of the Andean countries requested on various opportunities that the US end the certification process.
13 It is worth briefly noting the background of these developments. Not only the premises established in specific US foreign drug policy regulations, but also peculiar facts proper of the context in which those regulations were formulated are evidence of the influence of IR realism in the US policymaking community. To begin with, the "War on Drugs" was declared as such in the middle of the Cold War during which international politics strongly mirrored the practice of deterrence and counterbalances supported by the IR realist approach. Particularly interesting is also the academic background of two of the best known American academics who held high positions in the US foreign policy establishment in the 1970s: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. As commented by Viotti, there is not mere coincidence that both policymakers are both self-professed realists: "The Realist as academic speaks much the same language as the Realist as statesman: power, force, national interest …" in Paul Viotti and Mark V. The overemphasis on sending military aid to combat drugtrafficking in the Andean nations' territory, and the application for more than a decade of the unilateral certification process, denote that externalisation of danger, the perception that threats related to the drug problem come from abroad.
Such a perception not only reinforces the identification the US has made of itself as a victim of the drug trade, and of the drug problem as a national security issue. It also leaves aside the recognition that the US might also be an exporter of danger to the Andean nations, and thus, an exporter of insecurity abroad. In fact, the increasing international demand for drugs -in which the US plays a leading role -constitutes a serious danger for Andean nations. This demand is an incentive for the expansion of drug-trafficking in the Andean region, for the crime related to it, and for the various social and economic problems derived from the increasing illegal narcotics trade.
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Furthermore, not only US demand for drugs but also US foreign drug policies themselves cause problems in the Andean region. As noted by countless reports from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), the provision of US military aid is increasing the be an emerging consensus on the limits of its usefulness, certification has powerful supporters in the US Congress who will do whatever it takes to make sure that it remains in place. . Nonetheless, as noted by various analyses that have studied the illegal drug chain production and the formation of price in this regard, due to the lucrative US market, its demand for illegal drugs plays a leading role in accelerating supply.
militarisation of rural areas and human rights violations, creating a serious risk for fragile
Andean democracies that has a negative affect on their anti-narcotics efforts.
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With respect to the certification process, two interrelated perceptions based on the realist approach are implicit. First, that America's drug problem is constituted by foreign countries' deliberate refusal to cooperate. Second, that without external pressure on targeted countries these will not increase their counter-drug efforts. The former is grounded in the realist focus on nation-states as the main actors in international politics, and discounts the fact that domestic pressures may lead to outcomes other than compliance. 25 The latter as noted by Bagley, is based on the realist premise that emphasises the full range of national power resources to obtain desired responses from otherwise "uncooperative" states. 26 These realist perceptions that externalise danger are flawed with respect to the drug problem.
As Flynn 27 puts it, the persistence of the illegal drug trade provides evidence of two important facts: one, that the international system is not simply the sum of its states, and power that permit them to attract, extort, and corrupt state and non-state actors.
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Narcotraffickers attract peasants to the production of illegal drugs through the provision of goods and services in scarce supply in Andean rural areas. Furthermore, since narcotraffic also finances other transnational crime practices such as black market arms trafficking, 30 this enhances their capability to corrupt or intimidate police and judicial authorities, and increase violence and criminal activity throughout the hemisphere. Thus, the process of certification narrowly focused on the state puts an excessive burden on Andean countries which have to respond to the US for crimes executed by non-state transnational criminal actors.
As explained by Gonzales, 31 another major flaw in US foreign drug policy is the assumption that the governments submitted to the process of certification design and implement their drug policies only because of the pressure of the threats of sanctions.
Given the powerful position of the US in the region, it cannot be denied that US pressure plays a role, especially regarding deadlines and guidelines in the application of drug policies. Nonetheless, to assume that unless the threats imposed by the process of certification Andean governments would not be involved in anti-narcotics efforts is not correct. As research in this regard notes, in many instances domestic concerns -such as the protection of their citizens, and the fight against crime related to drug trafficking -are precisely the ones that make Andean governments double their counter-narcotic efforts.
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The so-called supplier nations are conscious of the need to fight against drug-trafficking and try to do this for the sake of their internal security and not just as a reaction to the pressure exercised by the US. Moreover, the fact that the US has granted certifications does not necessarily mean that the certification process is an effective strategy of control that makes governments abide with US counter-drug objectives. In many cases the US, using a double standard has certified countries as being cooperative based not on their counter-drug efforts, but on US strategic considerations. 33 By the same token, countries that were effectively cooperating with the US were decertified because at the time of the evaluation process they were considered of less importance for US interests. The de-certification of
Colombia by the US in the years 1996 and 1997 is a case in point. 34 Consequently, the characterisation of the US certification process by US policymakers as a necessary and compelling strategy of control is exaggerated.
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In sum, there is an evident contradiction between the reality of the Andean nations with respect to the illegal drug trade and the realist perception of "dangerous other"
implicit in the policies of control included in US foreign drug policy. Those perceptions locate the US and Andean nations in a conflicting position. The continuous application of policies of control reinforces such a conflict, worsening the security struggles among these nations linked by a narcotics problem.
Struggles of "notions" of security in US foreign drug policy
In the field of international relations, realism privileges the state (and specifically powerful states) as the main deserving referent of security and precludes the analysis of security experienced by individuals, groups, and communities at the sub-state level. such, realism fails to identify the most pressing concerns especially in the world's poorer states where people's main security concern is clearly how to survive until tomorrow.
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Although during the early 1990s certain policies of aid were introduced as part of US foreign drug policy with the purpose of tackling some of the economic problems affecting peasant producers of illegal drugs in the Andean rural region, US policymakers do not consider these problems as security issues. What is worse, the fact that the persistence of economic and social vulnerabilities affecting the people from these rural zones constitutes a matter of [in]security not only for this people but also for Andean nations and the US as well is overlooked. As a result, more emphasis has been given to the application of policies of control. Furthermore, in various aspects that application has obstructed the objectives the policies of aid were supposed to promote.
Peasants in the Andean rural areas where coca is produced face extreme poverty, increasing food deficits, rural unemployment, and underemployment. Infrastructure problems such as the lack of roads and transportation facilities, unavailability of reasonable credits, and expensive inputs, among others, limit the access of peasants to legal viable economic opportunities. In contrast, the illegal drug industry offers peasants opportunities the state and legal crops do not. Rural labourers earn more working in the drug industry than by growing legal crops, and in some cases there is simply no other option. The lack of jobs in Andean rural areas forces many peasants to leave their homelands and move to zones where coca is already produced; or to farm distant zones where, under the orders of drug-traffickers, coca is about to be produced. Besides job opportunities, the drug-traffickers offer "solutions" to the serious problems of farm-tomarket infrastructure legal crops face. Peasants working for the illegal drug industry do not have to worry about inputs, transportation, and distribution. Drug-traffickers send their "agents" directly to the peasants' villages to provide inputs and to collect the final product: the coca leaves or cocaine.
37 See Ken Booth, New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991). Also see the work of Brian Job (1992). With respect to the traditional "security dilemma" framework (which assumes threats come from outside boundaries) Job notes the need for an alternative one that can provide a better analytical handle on the security of peoples in the Third World where states are preoccupied with internal rather than external security. He proposes the concept "insecurity dilemma" as a more comprehensive framework to understand the insecurities faced by individuals and social groups.
Between becoming part of illegal narcotics production and facing unemployment and increased poverty, peasants choose the former. Although drug production provides some income to the peasants, the drug traffickers are the ones that profit most from the drug trade.
38 Peasants do not become rich and their communities do not achieve economic development either. Instead, what narcotics production promotes is particular forms of "coca" not necessarily related to consumption but mainly to the creation of social and cultural problems that worsen the already devastated economic situation in Andean rural areas.
The illegal drug industry recruits not only peasants growers of coca, but also inhabitants of the towns located close to the coca fields to work in the transportation of crops, the processing of cocaine, and in additional services required by drug traffickers at the beginning of the production chain. The so-called "coca-towns" become dangerously "dependent" on drug capital in two ways. First, they depend on illegal capital and outside markets. 39 As described by Narvaez, 40 that dependence is indeed another form of slavery.
Since coca money provides for everything in the peasants' villages, when for some reason coca buyers do not come there is total chaos. Second, an artificial infrastructure created by drug-trafficking promotes a culture of "consumerism" imported by the inhabitants of the coca-towns. 41 Although these towns lack basic infrastructure (paved streets, drinking water, schools, and health services that should have been provided by the state but which do not exist), their inhabitants, because they are linked to drug-trafficking have access to superfluous goods such as bars, discotheques, and car and stereo dealerships. 42 The fast 38 Various specialized reports acknowledge this issue. The Latin American Working Group reports that only about 0.5% of the US $1million that users may pay for a kilogram of cocaine goes to the growers of the main raw material. 39 For instance, Mac Gregor notes that in the region of Chapare (Bolivia) and in the areas of the Yungas, the illegal trade of coca has pulled the prices of other products with it, and there has been an increase in land prices and speculation. However, he points out, the most significant impacts are that the settlers are increasingly dependent on cocaine trafficking capital, and that the number of growers involved in processing cocaine sulphate is rising daily. 
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The structural violence mentioned above caused by the devastating economic situation in Andean rural areas where coca is produced is accentuated by the violence associated with the presence of antagonistic groups that had turned these areas into war zones.
Besides the criminal violence associated with narcotraffic, there is the presence of armed groups in the rural areas of Colombia and Peru, 49 and in the case of Colombia there are 43 Coca buyers arrive into the villages driving modern cars, wearing gold jewelry and expensive clothes, and with dollars at hand that allow them to pay not only for the coca production but also for alcohol consumption and additional "services" in bars and discotheques. 44 Narvaez, "Responding to the Illegal Drugs Trade", p. 11. Narvaez also notes that in Remolinos, a little town in Colombia where 85% of the people is engaged in coca cultivation, more than one thousand youngsters collect the coca leaf crops every two months. When the coca crop is ripe the few schools empty because parents need their children for the leaf picking. the peasants have reverted to coca cultivation. As a result, ADPs have suffered from eradication programs rather than acting as a complement to the same overall strategy.
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Moreover, aerial fumigation has also had significant human costs in Colombia where an absence of short-term food aid or long-term development aid for poor farmers and their families has exacerbated hunger and desperation when food crops are fumigated along with drug crops.
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Another problem with the policies of aid has to do with the way in which these are Furthermore, the failures attributed to ADPs could also be attributed to the policies of control in US foreign drug policy such as the process of certification and the provision of military aid, especially considering that these policies have received more emphasis and funding than that given to ADPs. In fact, despite the deployment of thousands of US troops in support of the drug war, the increasing US funding in this regard, the wellpublicised tactical successes in interdiction results, and the annual application of the process of certification, these strategies have not lowered regional production of drugs or restricted the availability of illegal drugs in the US either. Illegal drugs are cheaper and more readily available now than they were when the war on drugs was launched.
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In sum, the previous analysis of US foreign drug policies makes it evident first, that the state-based realist notion of security prevailing in this policy area does not necessarily correspond to the situation of insecurity caused by the drug problem in the Andean region. The restricted notion of security does not take into consideration the problems of sub-national actors such as the rural communities exposed to the leverage of narcotraffickers, and the difficulty that Andean governments face in maintaining control 
III.-Guidelines for a more appropriate securitization of the drug problem
As described in the previous sections of this paper, the current securitixation of the drug problem based on a restrictive and negative definition of national security 58 yields harmful consequences. Nonetheless, given the threatening effects of the drug problem, its securitisation -in a more appropriate and less harmful way -is crucial. In order to take the first step towards a coherent application of US foreign drug policy, the securitisation of the drug problem requires widening of the narrow spectrum of security currently prevailing in this policy area.
Recognising that security is an area of competing actors but a biased one in which the state is still privileged as the actor endowed with security attributes, the "Copenhagen than the traditional military and political. Security is viewed as comprising five "sectors:" military, environmental, economic, political, and societal. However, this school warns, the expansion of the security agenda is not just about tacking the word "security" onto economic, environmental, and societal. Instead, it requires giving careful thought to what is meant by security and applying that understanding to a range of dynamics fundamentally different from the traditional ones.
Each sector has its own referent object and threat agenda. Thus, a variety of different values (i.e.: sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) can be the focus of power struggles. 60 In the military sector, the state -concretely, its territorial integrityhas been and largely remains the primary referent object, and the threats are defined in external, military terms. In contrast, in the environmental sector security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere, and the threat lies on the circular relationship between civilisation and the environment in which the manipulation of this latter by the former has achieved self-defeating proportions. In the political sector, the legitimacy of a governmental authority is the referent object. The relevant threats can be ideological and sub-states. As a result, state authorities may be threatened by elements of their own societies, or vice-versa, states could become the primary threat to their own societies. In the societal sector the identity of the social group or community is the an emergency case by policymakers in charge of the formulation and implementation of US foreign drug policy. The "securitization" of these vulnerabilities constitutes an essential condition to analyse more properly the situation currently existing in Andean rural zones. Under the lenses of realism whose referent object is the state it is not possible to see the various security sectors and the threats above mentioned or to consider as security issues those vulnerabilities affecting individuals. In order to expand the security agenda in US foreign drug policy and securitise the drug problem appropriately it is necessary to see this under different lenses.
Critical voices in the field of international relations warn that questions of representation, which are systematically excluded from foreign policy discourse, must be included if the United States is to be more capable in the future of understanding itself and the world in which it lives. 64 Otherwise, it is said, US policymakers, by failing to reflect upon the way they construct the reality of other regions, will continue to respond to that reality in traditional fashion instead of enhancing possibilities for more appropriate foreign policy options. 65 In this regard, among the various theoretical developments in the field of international relations that reject one or more of the realist key assumptions, voices from feminism, critical theory, and postmodernism can shed light on a more responsible analysis of the drug problem in Andean nations.
The important positions in IR mentioned above -which I will call here "critical approaches"-are impossible to summarise or group together without oversimplification.
Nevertheless, it is plausible to underline some of their most common concerns and recommendations. Despite their differences, 66 all critical approaches argue for new forms of political community which are both less exclusionary towards those considered outsiders by traditional state-centered approaches, and more sensitive to their interests and needs. For instance, critical theory opens the way for analysis not only of poorer states but also of peoples whose lives have been characterised by poverty. 67 Post indigenous groups. 68 The goal of the feminist security discourse is to point out how unequal social relations can make all individuals insecure and to help conceptualise a definition of security that is people-centred and which transcends state and regional boundaries. 69 In general, critical approaches envisage a moral universalisation in which the recognition of the rights of non-nationals, and the need for collective action to promote the well-being of the marginal and excluded come to acquire greater significance in discussions about the purpose of foreign policy. 70 Their mode of inquiry is the social construction of the other in different contexts, providing a framework to study the relations between core states, and the people of the periphery. 71 They propose a politics of emancipation that looks to a democratic form of human security not achieved at the expense of others.
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The pursuit of these principles towards building a political community based on less exclusionary and more sensitive practices towards Andean nations may sound utopian or less effective for defenders of the traditional policies of control in the "war on drugs."
However, non-government and non-profit organisations have applied these principles in concrete enterprises, with positive results in Andean rural areas. 73 These principles also coincide with some objectives of alternative development programmes supported by the United Nations, the European Union, and even by the US itself.
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An expanded security agenda beyond the traditional referents of security might help to improve the effectiveness of the policies of aid included in US foreign drug policy, and to modify the formulation and application of the policies of control. The following sections describe the important and concrete lessons that could be derived from critical approaches for the modification of current US foreign drug policies towards Andean countries.
Guidelines to reduce the struggles of security among "nations" in US foreign drug policy
Noting that the definition of power solely as domination and control obscures elements of cooperation in interstate relations, 75 feminist voices in the field of international relations propose an alternative definition of power as the human ability to act in concert and to enable methods of cooperation based on coalition-building. 76 Feminists consider as venues to foster environments conducive to cooperation, methods of conflict resolution that seek to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes and involve making contextual judgments rather than appealing to absolute standards.
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The application of these principles is of utmost importance with respect to the process The support of the US for the adequate implementation of the aforementioned projects is crucial. It requires of the US policy-making community a consistent effort to understand that, in order to achieve effective cooperation against the illegal drug trade, power cannot be exercised under the menace of sanctions and strategies that disrupt the security of the nations linked by the drug problem. would be a better understanding of the important role of the policies of aid included in US foreign drug policy. The provision of US aid directed at forging economic development in Andean rural areas has a special objective that goes beyond mere "economic assistance" that the US provides in other instances. It is a necessary tool to fight against the economic and social vulnerabilities that put in danger the areas where coca is produced, and thus, to fight against drug trafficking -which intensifies and reproduces most of those vulnerabilities. As such this aid is a matter of security for both the US and the Andean nations.
Unless a strong programme of aid is provided to promote legal products and close the income differentials between growing coca and other income opportunities, peasants will remain in the production of coca. Furthermore, presently they are the best available option to solve serious problems connected to and accelerated by drug trafficking, such as food scarcity and environmental decay in the regions where coca is grown and cocaine produced. In the medium and long run ADPs can help to improve the economic situation in these zones and thus, to direct peasants towards the production of legal crops.
As the description of current US policies mentioned in the previous sections has tried to underscore, in the area of US foreign drug policy towards Andean countries, issues such as US aid, US trade-concessions, Andean rural areas' development, and security (understood in wider terms) in the Andes and in the US, are all interrelated aspects.
Considering security in its wider definition, that is, as the absence of structural violence, US policymakers should take into account that development is an essential tool in the fight against drug trafficking. Development however, cannot be promoted through the deployment of military aid in the Andean region. The stress put on military aid in US foreign drug policy should be shifted towards policies of aid that promote trade, sustainable development, and thus security. , and "Global Trends, Lessons from Vienna" in http://www.mamacoca.org/FSMT_sept_2003/en/doc/jelsma_global_trends_en.htm 86 For instance, WOLA underscores the potential of ADPs as an important and effective tool both in combating the poverty of coca growing regions and in sustaining eradication efforts if these programs involve the local population in their design and implementation. In this regard for example, governors from Southern Colombia have offered to involve local communities in widespread but gradual manual eradication efforts coupled with rural development strategies. Likewise, the inclusion of market studies to ensure that alternative crops will provide a steady income for
Conclusion
The affirmation that realism has a strong policy-prescriptive component that has influenced US foreign policy is not new. Nonetheless, what this paper has attempted to underline is that this intersection between theory and practice has had an impact that goes beyond mere influence in the formulation and application of state-centered policies. The restricted realist framework of national security prevailing in this policy area (reflected in the content and application of US policies that coincide with the IR realist approach) has resulted not only in a biased and thus limited analysis of the drug problem, it has also contributed to accentuating the struggles of security among nations linked by the drug problem -the US and Andean countries -and the struggles among the notions of security affecting the various state and non-state actors affected by the illegal drug industry.
Furthermore, that intersection has led to an incoherent application of the various regulations existing within this US policy area. As a consequence, the policies of aid directed towards promoting trade and development in the region are obstructed by policies of control that promote military and uncooperative strategies.
In order to face the security struggles about nations and notions which are implicit and promoted by US foreign drug policies, a first step consists of questioning the way in which the securitisation of the drug problem has been carried out in this policy area. For that purpose, bringing a human vision of security into this policy area is more than necessary. That will permit us to understand first, that the drug problem implies various interrelated insecurities not only for the US but also for the so-called drug supplier countries, and second, the urgency of applying policies not achieved at the expense of the security of others.
The leading position of the US in the Western Hemisphere should be exercised not with "big stick diplomacy" but by assuming a shared responsibility in the drug problem.
US political power has to be understood in the US policymaking area as the ability to cooperate with and to empower Andean nations, not through military means but with aid policies directed at promoting trade and development. Aid, trade and development can farmers, and that these latter will have access to adequate post-harvest facilities and transport, as well the establishment of ADPs prior to the beginning of eradication efforts. See WOLA reports.
